Reading between the lines, the Principal Agent Problem appears to be the main issue that the SoftVest/HK/Tessler group is trying to nip in the bud. Here are some links on the age old problem.
The principal–agent problem, in political science and economics, (also known as agency dilemma or the agency problem) occurs when one person or entity (the “agent“) is able to make decisions and/or take actions on behalf of, or that impact, another person or entity: the “principal“.[1] This dilemma exists in circumstances where agents are motivated to act in their own best interests, which are contrary to those of their principals, and is an example of moral hazard.
Common examples of this relationship include corporate management (agent) and shareholders (principal), elected officials (agent) and citizens (principal), or brokers (agent) and markets (buyers and sellers, principals).[2] Consider a legal client (the principal) wondering whether their lawyer (the agent) is recommending protracted legal proceedings because it is truly necessary for the client’s well being, or because it will generate income for the lawyer. In fact the problem can arise in almost any context where one party is being paid by another to do something where the agent has a small or nonexistent share in the outcome, whether in formal employment or a negotiated deal such as paying for household jobs or car repairs.
The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master’s honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company. — Adam Smith (1776)
One of the ways to reduce agency costs is to align an agent’s interest with a principal’s interest, because the agency problem arises due to divergent interests. For example, requiring directors to own company shares can motivate directors to work for the company’s best interest, rather than directors’ interest. However, because directors are monitors and advisors, not managers, tying directors’ compensation with the company’s financial success may compromise their ability to provide effective oversight.[20] For instance, a director may become unwilling to approve risky projects that will negatively affect the company’s short-term profits but create long-term value,[21] if he prefers immediate financial gains from the company.
Apple’s new policy requires executive officers to hold three times their annual base salary in stock, and executives have five years to satisfy the requirement. The document also restates the company’s existing policy of requiring the chief executive to hold 10 times his annual base salary and nonemployee directors to hold five times their annual retainers, policies that were mentioned in the January proxy.
“That it is inseparably essential to the freedom of a people, and the undoubted right of Englishmen, that no taxes be imposed on them, but with their own consent, given personally, or by their representatives. That the people of these colonies are not, and from their local circumstances cannot be, represented in the House of Commons in Great-Britain. That the only representatives of the people of these colonies, are persons chosen therein by themselves, and that no taxes ever have been, or can be constitutionally imposed on them, but by their respective legislatures,” read the passage.
The Texas Pacific Land Trust Investor 