Press release here.
There was lots of chatter around $7/share this quarter in Yahoo Finance discussion boards and Seeking Alpha comment threads. The report of $6.52/share is a little light relative to the aforementioned prediction but it represents a fine period of 53% and 145% growth in the O&G royalty and water businesses respectively.
The $6.52 Q3 print puts TPL at $21.79 per share in trailing 12mo earnings. If we stick with the 38x P/E that was discussed in the last post, that gets “fair value” to $828. I say “fair value” loosely as picking a P/E is more art than science.
In the coming days I’m going to do some segment analysis to show top line and bottom line trends. One thing that is becoming readily apparent is that easements and sundry income will be lumpy as easement income is no longer being smoothed.
One small aberration was the 167 acre land sale at $25.7k/acre. TPL land sales are rare these days and that price was really something. This isn’t going to happen but the whole trust sold at that valuation gets the value of the surface acreage to ~$23B. Again, that is a big stretch but the sale shows the “hidden asset” nature of TPL which is easy to overlook in the current era of high flying top and bottom line growth.
Horizon Kinetics commented on the 3rd Quarter recently. As most know, HK is a large holder of TPL and represents the gold standard for TPL commentary and sentiment. Comments on TPL were pretty light this quarter but appear favorable.
Would encourage a read of this whole piece. You don’t find much else like it from other managers.
In prior webinars we reviewed one technique for locating such securities: look among the multitude that have been excluded from the indexation vortex and which might therefore be anomalously cheap, and which might have business models that are not exposed to the same risks. We described some marine shipping companies, even large-cap ones like AP Mollar-Maersk, some drilling service companies like Subsea 7, non-standard security types like Texas Pacific Land Trust, which is not even a corporation, and so on. They have excellent or even perfect balance sheets, so are not at risk from interest rate or credit market shocks, and they operate in cyclically depressed industries so that they have plenty of positive revenue optionality, as well as profit margin and valuation optionality. In the extreme, if you owned only one, you might not be exposed to any conventional systemic risk.
We’ve made use of a similar improvement over existing market structure to be exposed to oil – since energy could be both a source of risk to the economy as well as a source of investment return – without the complexities and limitations of conventional oil producers. An ExxonMobil, for instance, must spend enormous sums of money, each and every year, to explore for new reserves to replace that which is depleted. Texas Pacific Land Trust, like Wheaton Precious Metals, is also a royalty company. Despite its $6 billion market value, it has only 47 employees. Its latest pre-tax profit margin, for the June quarter, was 89%. The only companies one might be able to identify with profit margins that high, and there are very, very few, are royalty companies.
This isn’t in direct reference to TPL but I thought was worth sharing. Sourcewater is a startup aimed at connecting buyers and sellers of water and water disposal services. The company’s website is worth a look to get a better perspective on the West Texas water bonanza.
I have no connection to this company. Sharing for context only.
I enjoyed this long form sales pitch from the company. Some excerpts:
Just in the past few years, the average frac has gone from needing about 4 million gallons of water (100,000 barrels) to needing 20 million gallons (500,000 barrels) or more – sometimes much more. And most operators now frac a bunch of wells at the same time for efficiency (called “pad drilling” or “zipper fracs”) so the amount of water they need in the span of just a few days could be millions of barrels, maybe even close to 100 million gallons – in just a few days.
In fact, water is in such high demand that oil and gas operators are buying water anywhere they can get it. For example, Pioneer Natural Resources, one of the top Permian operators, recently made a deal with the local cities of Odessa and Midland to buy and reuse their sewage water for fracking. Many operators are starting to recycle the water that comes out of the ground with the oil and gas they produce, taking that “produced water” and injecting it into the next frac to save on both freshwater needs and disposal costs.
Mineral rights are not usually owned by the person who owns the land. But under Texas law and in some other oil and gas states, surface landowners always own the water. That means a lot of people who were always locked out of oil booms of the past because they didn’t own their mineral rights can finally get in on the action. Any landowner near an active oil or gas formation with water under their land is sitting on a gold mine. Not black gold. Clear gold. Liquid gold.
Sourcewater already has thousands of active users registered on its marketplace with more than 1 billion barrels of water listed for sale and over 100,000 water sources just in Texas. Energy companies and service companies search for water on Sourcewater.com every single day, looking for the water they need for their next frac site. Ready to become a water millionaire? Create a free water listing on Sourcewatertoday.
Pull the link up in Google Chrome and click translate if you too failed first semester Spanish in undergrad.
TPL royalties have an approximate weighted average value of 5%, which is considerably lower than the standard paid in the Permian; This is a powerful incentive for producers to continue increasing production on TPL lands.
Another obstacle for investors who are comfortable with TPL is the near impossibility of assigning a value and anchoring it. TPL is an example of how optionality plays an important role. If I had to value TPL in the past, I would have assigned zero to the water business. I would not even have known.
In last year’s letter, I explained that I was looking for convex situations. These are situations in which, when the facts appear and are positive, they have a greater effect than when they are negative; TPL perfectly fulfills that attribute.
A few posts down, I posited a theory that $TPL share price weakness apparent in the first month of calendar quarters was due to a lack of buying from the trust. My hunch was that the trust was prohibited from buying due to it having material non-public information in the form of quarterly earnings (blackout). Some crude analysis showed that my theory appeared to hold water.
It was fun while it lasted. The (cruder still) analysis below shoots some holes in my bucket.
A logical extension of my blackout theory is that we should see a dip in average daily trading volumes during the first month of each quarter. This was barely the case. Since the stock split in July 2007, the first month of each calendar quarter has had an average daily volume that was lower than the average daily volume of the entire quarter in 23 out of 44 quarters. Or 52.2%. Hard to call that significant.
So, without wasting anymore of your time, here a couple charts that make the point. Volume in the first month of calendar quarters does not appear to follow any easily discernable pattern.
It’s hard not to marvel at growth in royalty barrels of oil (and the MCF of gas) that TPL has seen since 2008. Royalty oil barrels have seen a 26.4% CAGR over the past 9 years while GAS MCF has grown 28.6% on an annualized basis. As impressive as that is, growth recently has been going parabolic as detailed in the 2017 annual report.
Oil and gas royalty revenue was $61.3 million for the year ended December 31, 2017 compared to $30.0 million for the year ended December 31, 2016, up 104.4%. Oil royalty revenue was $38.8 million, up 76.3% and gas royalty revenue was $14.8 million, up 85.3%. Additionally, oil and gas royalty revenue for the year ended December 31, 2017 included $7.7 million related to an arbitration settlement with Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
Crude oil production increased 43.8% in 2017 compared to 2016. The average price received in 2017 was $47.33 per barrel, compared to $38.60 in 2016. Gas production increased 59.8% in 2017. The average price of gas received increased to $3.56 per MCF in 2017 from $3.07 in 2016. State oil and gas production taxes were $2.9 million in 2017 compared to $1.6 million in 2016.
Of course this can’t last forever but it is reasonable to expect continued growth for some intermediate period. Along with that growth will come top line growth if oil prices continue to play ball.
As detailed in the 2Q 10Q, 2018 will obviously be another leap.
Oil and gas royalties. Oil and gas royalty revenue was $30.3 million for the three months ended June 30, 2018 compared to $12.2 million for the three months ended June 30, 2017. Oil royalty revenue was $24.7 million for the three months ended June 30, 2018 compared to $8.8 million for the comparable period of 2017. This increase in oil royalty revenue is principally due to the combined effect of a 117.0% increase in crude oil production subject to the Trust’s royalty interest, and a 29.4% increase in the average price per royalty barrel of crude oil during the three months ended June 30, 2018 compared to the same period in 2017. Gas royalty revenue was $5.6 million for the three months ended June 30, 2018, an increase of 63.0% over the three months ended June 30, 2017 when gas royalty revenue was $3.4 million. This increase in gas royalty revenue resulted from a volume increase of 138.0% for the three months ended June 30, 2018 as compared to the same period of 2017, partially offset by a 31.7% decrease in the average price received.
Yes, you read that right. 117% increase in oil production. Where could we go from here?
Thinking about revenue, if we assume 2Q production growth to be equal that for all of 2017, we could get to a total annual royalty barrel number of 1,776,913. At a price of $61.20 (29% above last year), ballpark oil top line comes out at $109MM.
10% growth sequentially on that for the next 4 years gets us to $120MM (2019), $132MM (2020), $144MM (2021), and $159MM (2022). When 2018 estimates are included, that is $664MM cumulatively. Or about 11% of market cap.
That’s just oil. And at 10% growth. And for 5 years.
Tack on another ~30% to that number for gas and you get to $863MM. That gets you to 14% of market cap.
This is all before the taxman takes his (now reduced!) bite.
Nevertheless, the outlook for buybacks appears bright.
Author’s note: I probably screwed this up. Let me know where I went wrong. Also, let me know if you think my assumptions are terrible.
Special thanks to JackFutures from SeekingAlpha for sharing his many data series!