10-K Published

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/97517/000009751720000017/tpl-20191231.htm

On January 22, 2020, the Committee announced that, following a deliberation process initiated in June 2019, the Committee recommended to the Trustees that the Trust convert from a trust into a Delaware C-corporation. The Committee analyzed reasons for and alternatives to conversion with support from a team of advisors to the Trust, including financial advisor Credit Suisse and outside legal counsel. The Committee’s deliberations focused particularly on tax, corporate, corporate governance, accounting and business implications of the proposed conversion.
On February 20, 2020, the Trust and the Investor Group entered into the First Amendment to Settlement Agreement (the “Settlement Agreement Amendment”). The Settlement Agreement Amendment provides that the Decision Period will extend through March 6, 2020.
The decision of whether to convert the Trust into a C-corporation is subject to the determination of the Trustees. The Committee recommended that, if the Trustees elect to authorize the conversion, the conversion should follow a process intended to ensure a smooth transition that would be tax-free to shareholders. As proposed, the Trust would transfer all its assets, including cash, land, Texas Pacific Water Resources (“TPWR”), and other assets, to a wholly-owned limited liability company subsidiary of the Trust (“TPL Holdco”). The Trust would then contribute all of the equity in TPL Holdco, holding all of the Trust’s assets, to a newly-created corporation (“TPL Corporation”). Shareholders of the Trust would receive an amount of shares in TPL Corporation proportional to their ownership of shares in the Trust. When this process as recommended is completed, shares of the Trust would be cancelled. Shareholders of the Trust would not need to take any action to receive the new shares in TPL Corporation.
The process recommended by the Committee would require filings with the SEC and approval of the listing of the new shares by the New York Stock Exchange (the “NYSE”).
Comp on page 24.  Seems excessive.
On August 8, 2019, the Trust entered into employment agreements (the “Agreements”) with Mr. Glover, its General Agent and Chief Executive Officer (the “Glover Agreement”), Mr. Packer, its General Agent and Chief Financial Officer (the “Packer Agreement”) and Mr. Parasnis, its Chief Commercial Officer and Executive Vice President (the “Parasnis Agreement”). The Agreements were effective as of July 1, 2019.
Under the Agreements, Mr. Glover and Mr. Packer will each receive a base salary of $800,000 per annum and Mr. Parasnis will receive a base salary of $700,000 per annum, subject to annual review, and be eligible for an annual cash bonus of up to 300% of such base salary for achievement of specified performance targets, except that with respect to Mr. Glover and Mr. Packer, the cash bonus for the calendar year 2019 will be at least 100% of the cash bonus paid with respect to 2018, as established by the Nominating, Compensation and Governance Committee of the Trust. Until the Trust establishes an equity compensation plan, Mr. Glover, Mr. Packer and Mr. Parasnis are required to use at least 25% of their cash bonuses (net of estimated taxes) to purchase shares of the Trust’s common stock. The term of each of the Glover Agreement and the Packer Agreement ends on December 31, 2020, with automatic one (1) year extensions unless notice not to renew is given by either party at least 120 days prior to the relevant end date. The term of the Parasnis Agreement ends on December 31, 2022, with automatic one (1) year extensions unless notice not to renew is given by either party at least 120 days prior to the relevant end date. Under the Parasnis Agreement, the cash bonus for 2019 is prorated for the period of employment during such year. Additionally, Mr. Parasnis is entitled to a retention bonus in the amount of $875,000, payable in three installments on March 15, 2020 and the second and third anniversaries of the effective date of the Parasnis Agreement and is eligible for a relocation allowance in the amount of $100,000 to cover his relocation to Dallas, Texas.
The team still owns 1600 shares combined.  Interests don’t appear aligned.
The HBS case in the making continues.
Doesn’t the comp agreement mandate share purcases?  Where are they?  Why are they all so slow to get skin in the game?
Under the Agreements, Mr. Glover and Mr. Packer will each receive a base salary of $800,000 per annum and Mr. Parasnis will receive a base salary of $700,000 per annum, subject to annual review, and be eligible for an annual cash bonus of up to 300% of such base salary for achievement of specified performance targets, except that with respect to Mr. Glover and Mr. Packer, the cash bonus for the calendar year 2019 will be at least 100% of the cash bonus paid with respect to 2018, as established by the Nominating, Compensation and Governance Committee of the Trust. Until the Trust establishes an equity compensation plan, Mr. Glover, Mr. Packer and Mr. Parasnis are required to use at least 25% of their cash bonuses (net of estimated taxes) to purchase shares of the Trust’s common stock. The term of each of the Glover Agreement and the Packer Agreement ends on December 31, 2020, with automatic one (1) year extensions unless notice not to renew is given by either party at least 120 days prior to the relevant end date. The term of the Parasnis Agreement ends on December 31, 2022, with automatic one (1) year extensions unless notice not to renew is given by either party at least 120 days prior to the relevant end date. Under the Parasnis Agreement, the cash bonus for 2019 is prorated for the period of employment during such year. Additionally, Mr. Parasnis is entitled to a retention bonus in the amount of $875,000, payable in three installments on March 15, 2020 and the second and third anniversaries of the effective date of the Parasnis Agreement and is eligible for a relocation allowance in the amount of $100,000 to cover his relocation to Dallas, Texas.
How does a CEO that makes $4MM a year get away with never talking to investors?  Big boy pay = big boy responsibilities.  Time to get with it, fellas.

$16/Share Div Payout

*Texas Pacific Land Trust Declares Cash Div of $10/Sub-Shr, an Increase of $8.25 Over Cash Div Paid in 2019 >TPL

*Texas Pacific Land Trust Declares Special Div of $6/Sub-Shr, an Increase of $1.75 Over Special Div Paid in 2019 >TPL

$16 x 7,756,156 = $124MM payout.

$250MM on balance sheet as of 9/30.  Plus another ~$60MM generated in 4Q ($91MM cash rev – $23MM op ex -$6MM cash tax =$62MM) less payout implies that ~$186MM remains.  $24/share held back.

https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20200224005312/en/Texas-Pacific-Land-Trust-Declares-Regular-Special

DALLAS–(BUSINESS WIRE)–Texas Pacific Land Trust (NYSE: TPL) announced today that its Trustees have declared a cash dividend of $10.00 per sub-share, an increase of $8.25 over the cash dividend paid in 2019, payable March 16, 2020 to sub-shareholders of record at the close of business on March 9, 2020. This is the 17th consecutive year that the regular dividend has increased. Additionally, the Trustees declared a special dividend of $6.00 per sub-share, an increase of $1.75 over the special dividend paid in 2019, payable March 16, 2020 to sub-shareholders of record at the close of business on March 9, 2020.

Does $10/sub share (regular dividend raised 5.7x) set you up for a $1/share div post split?  Hard to take that regular div bar down.  ~$77MM/year will now no longer be used towards repurchases.

Produced Water

High Country News: There’s a new boom in the Permian Basin — wastewater

In five years, the Permian is forecast to generate 32 million barrels of produced water per day, up from four million a day currently. By 2030, that number could rise to 38 million barrels daily, analysts say. And it will be increasingly difficult to dispose of the wastewater. Industry analysts say the basin will eventually run out of suitable places to drill disposal wells — another incentive for oil and gas operators to recycle.

From the Raymond James report linked above:

In our forecast and this piece, we have placed an undue focus on the Permian basin, particularly the Delaware. While most readers will know it is the heart of U.S. oil activity, there is a particular reason why it is top of mind for produced water. New wells in the Delaware Basin are coming online with water-oil-ratios as high as 10-to-1, a level of water production typically exhibited in a decades-old conventional well. Across the basin, initial WORs of 4 or even 6-to-1 are viewed as “normal.” This is in contrast to other prolific shale basins such as the Midland, Eagle Ford, and Bakken, where WORs start at a 1-2x range, and expand slowly to 2-5x. In the graph on the left, we forecast water production grows to over 32 million barrels per day by 2025, for a CAGR of 10% over the period. As the Permian basin shifts further into manufacturing mode, the water growth we project will create the need for nearly 1,000 additional salt water disposal wells by 2030. Even taking an impossibly bullish outlook with water recycling (100% of frac water coming from recycling), we will still need ~750 additional disposal wells in the Permian Basin (more on this below). By 2030, we predict there will be a total need for ~1750 salt water disposal wells, assuming 80% utilization. While many companies involved in SWDs cite 80% as their target utilization, water pressure at the surface and in the formation can limit disposal capabilities, meaning demand for SWDs may be closer to 3,000 under realistic utilization assumptions. This incremental demand for SWDs we estimate represents a $7-$9 billion dollar investment in the Permian Basin alone.

Margin Watch

2019 margin analysis

My way of backing into water.  Back non-water revenue out of EBITDA.  Add “old expenses” and legal (big $$$$) to the adjusted EBITDA number to get a ballpark water income.  Look at water income relative to water top line to observe expenses and margins.

Seperately we can look at margin without asset sales.

Both margins are contracting.

It is understood that one has to spend money to make money, expecially in the water business, but I’d love more information on the end game.